Europe is visibly disintegrating – politically, socially and morally. Panagiotis Kondylis (1943-1998), a historian of ideas today only read in certain specialist circles, writes the following in his work Planetary Politics after the Cold War: "Compared to the classical ethical tradition – from the pre-Socratics to the Enlightenment via Plato, Aristotle, and Christianity – a loss of verisimilitude and a feeling for reality [Realitätssinn] has occurred insofar as this tradition was grounded in the fact and necessity of reason’s incessant struggle against the overflowing urge of ineradicable drives and passions, and — directly or indirectly — placed this struggle at the centre of its considerations. In contrast, today's universalist ethics do not seem to have any serious, even theoretically articulated concerns about man’s ability to permanently master the murkier layers of his existence. Instead, its efforts are directed towards furnishing epistemologically sound definitions of reason, obligation, etc., from which — rather tautologically — ethical desiderata and the comforting social consequences of their fulfillment are then deduced. The programmatic or factual elimination of all anthropological and historical factors necessitates that every binding doctrine of virtue and duty also be dispensed with, upon which the constructions pile up in the vacuum of logical consistency." (Kondylis, 113)

What Kondylis thus describes from the metaperspective of the historian of ideas — one which does not always do justice to the specific, inner complexities of specific situations or constellations of facts [Sachverhalte] — is in a sense reminiscent of the reflections of Ludwig Wittgenstein, for whom ethics could never be elaborated as a science of anything, let alone morality. Yet unlike Wittgenstein, Kondylis does not reject the general idea of employing moral-philosophical constructions to capture [einfangen] ethics (for Wittgenstein, ethics was something supernatural or mystical), but rather laments the fact that ‘ethics’, which in modern times [in der Neuzeit] crystallised as a program of ethical universalism articulated in principle in human rights and institutionally in the United Nations, is above all else blind to its historical function and, lacking connection to any well-elaborated political anthropology, becomes a "battlefield on which each of the competing sides will fight to enforce its own interpretation of the aforementioned principles against all other interpretations". (Ibid., 113)

As a theorist of power and decision, Kondylis emphasises in several passages of the above cited work — a new edition of which shall be published by the Carlsbad Institute in 2026 — the inability of moral-philosophical theoretical constructs to account for the political and social function of their own premises and conclusions. This habitus has become firmly established in the West, especially since the Enlightenment, and today constitutes the universal mainstream of academic discussion: Kantians, utilitarians, followers of critical theory — today all indulge in a certain form of ethical universalism because they understand its principles of equality, cultural invariance, impartiality, and logical consistency to be unavoidable axioms of socio-political and thus also ethical discourse. Accusations of a general dysfunctionality of this axiomatic system, repeatedly confirmed by events outside the academic context, are usually countered by its defenders, especially the (Neo-)Kantians, with the argument that it can no longer be a question of whether ethical universalism still works as a method of procedural reason or not (the primary concern of Rawls and Habermas), but rather that universalism is indomitable because, in the words of Georg Mohr, it is the "presupposition of every moral standpoint". (Mohr, 401-411)

But are these axioms, on which Mohr seeks to base ethical universalism, truly irrefutable? At the very least, doubts here are warranted. For Kondylis, the axioms of ethical universalism are highly presuppositional; his method is not to examine the inner mechanics of the various systems of ethical universalism, but rather to draw our attention to its external political and social conditions which can be clearly linked to economic and religious interests and thus ultimately capable of reshaping any moral standpoint. He is thus not concerned with demonstrating how the idea that universally valid moral principles and norms apply to all people at all times and in all places regardless of cultural or individual differences can be operationalised in ethics. Rather, he makes clear how, in modern times, ethical universalism has been exploited in a drastic manner both geopolitically and economically, thus creating a paradigm easily transferrable to societies neither able nor willing to adopt the rules thereof: "The expectations that the West has raised by exporting its ethical universalism to the rest of the world have explosive potential. The victory of the West’s ideas has not relieved it, but instead burdened it with tasks and liabilities under whose pressure it could change fundamentally". (Kondylis, 116) The ongoing wars, geopolitical upheavals, and distributive struggles show that the burden of ethical universalism has become so great that its centrifugal forces now outweigh the centripetal. The rebalancing of power relations has impelled and continues to impel the rise of political, social and ethical particularisms which make transparent that the universal law of rational agreement neither can nor should longer apply, but that another law is returning to the political and social realm, one more reminiscent of the old law of the jungle or even certain political strategies which we might associate with the positions of Callicles, Machiavelli, or Nietzsche. 

This naturally raises the question of how we should deal with the situation of an ethical universalism increasingly alienated from social and political realities underpinning it; one which, while not entirely novel, is certainly unprecedented in its global scope. In view of these developments, can ethical universalism still be justified? How can today's ethical universalism survive when it is inextricably linked to the victory of Western ideas that are increasingly being called into question? How can ‘the West’ — insofar as in the midst of its ongoing self-dissolution it is still able and willing to perceive itself as such (since, as Josephine Quinn notes, now that the expression "Christian West" has been successfully deconstructed, it is now that of "the West" that finds itself on the block) — continue to assert itself in the great game of social and political ideas and interests?

The answer is anything but simple. It therefore seems sensible to first look at the historical and philosophical causes that might have paved the way for ethical universalism’s considerable success whilst at the same time sowing the seeds of destruction in the fruits of its triumph. In current analyses of the value and disadvantages of ethical universalism for humanity, opinions often differ diametrically, which should hardly be surprising. While some, such as Hans Joas, believe that ethical universalism and all its consequences, which are enshrined in the notion of human rights, can somehow be saved, others — such as Panagiotis Kondylis — see in its momentous decline the starting point for a power struggle between different political and social systems of ideas. Still others believe that it is possible for ethical universalism to return to its original sources and qualities, though these must first be recognised and understood.

But first let us turn to Joas' position. In his new book on universalism, Universalismus: Weltherrschaft und Menschheitsethos, the sociologist of religion Joas does not apparently believe the West has to change at all in order to maintain and make plausible ethical universalism as a value independent of culture and mentality. Rather, he assumes — not unlike Kondylis — that what is at stake when it comes to ethical universalism is not any specific theoretical idea about ethics or morality, but that we are instead engaged with a byproduct of the debate on so-called ‘political universalism’. (Joas, 26) According to Joas, we can understand ethical universalism only in dialogue with the history of empires; that is to say, as reactions to these empires’ claims to world domination or as attempts by the aforementioned to somehow justify themselves. In emphasising the unexplained idea of a unifying human ethos, Joas is of the opinion that ethical universalism did not originate in the West, but developed in equal measure in various cultural spheres between 800 and 200 BC. He further believes that the core message of ethical universalism is not located in the democratic ideals of the 18th and 19th centuries, but rather in the religious wars of the 17th century. For Joas, the foundations of ethical universalism are thus not to be found in the progress of reason and self-determination, but in experiences of violence and manifold violations of the fundamental right to the integrity of the person. Joas correctly distinguishes here between the idea of ethical universalism and its political, economic and social implementation, but forgets that these experiences are precisely the consequences of the enforcement of a rather perverted idea of ethical universalism.

In contrast to Kondylis, Joas develops an ‘affirmative genealogy’ of the human ethos that does not grant normative priority to any culture, least of all the European. For Joas, the universal sacrality of the person through which the human ethos can unfold stands at the centre of things. (Ibid., 857) Joas does not provide a satisfactory answer to the questions we posed above, partly because he generally avoids making normative statements and addressing ethical universalism as a genuinely Western political and social idea. Nevertheless, at the end of his book, he poses an important question: How can ethical universalism be prevented from serving as an imperial ideology? (Ibid., 898) Joas, a Catholic who attaches great importance to religion in the justification of ethical universalism, is clearly suspicious of any form of hegemony: the logical consequence of his position would be to reject missionary Christianity or missionary Islam as imperial ideologies. Like Marxists, Kantians and utilitarians, Joas, despite his different premises, retreats to a moral standpoint that he inseverably links to the idea of a human ethos. Yet this moral standpoint, which only ethical universalists (who suddenly become normative relativists with regard to the validity of anti-universalist approaches) are allowed to invoke, is extremely fragile and can be overturned with a stroke of the pen.

Robert Spaemann, one of the last great conservative intellectuals in Germany, does not — unlike Joas and in partial agreement with Kondylis — shy away from clearly associating ethical universalism with the West or with Europe. For Spaemann, it is a consequence of the spread of scientific civilisation in the 19th century and historicism (to which Joas, as a disciple of Ernst Troeltsch, necessarily adheres) that ethical universalism, having rid itself of its metaphysical presuppositions, transmogrified into radical cultural relativism. Kondylis argues in a similar vein, viewing, like Spaemann, ethical universalism as an expression of a general ‘functionalism’ of modernity. This functionalism, both made possible and actually brought into being by ‘European self-relativisation’, (Spaemann, 85) was, as indicated at the outset, extremely persuasive in proclaiming with full conviction that the age of virtue and traditional (Christian) values was over and a new age of merchants and functionaries had begun (in the exact words of Edmund Burke: "The age of chivalry is gone. — That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever.") Like Kondylis, Spaemann sees this degeneration of ethical universalism emanating from ‘old Europe’ as a burden that continues to weigh on global society to this day. This has been and still is the cause of numerous political and social tensions: "Having exported the poison," he writes, "Europe is obliged to export the antidote". (Ibid., 89) Joas clearly does not share this diagnosis, because his claims that Europe did not spread this poison, and that ethical universalism should be understood as an instrument of power wielded by the powerful and only to be domesticated within the framework of a nebulous humanistic ethos, lead him to the conclusion that the West does not bear any responsibility in this regard. Spaemann and Kondylis, by contrast, believe we have no choice but to deal with this toxic legacy. While Kondylis, the ‘Enlightenment thinker without a mission,’ believes the West, having embarked on a hopeless struggle between divergent particularistic views over the political implementation of ethical universalism, is no longer in any position to export the crucial antidote, Spaemann believes that ethical universalism can still be saved without being able or willing to restore it to its old position. For Spaemann, the ancient concept of physis is an important standard, because without an understanding of what is inherently good and right (physei/physikon dikaion), we cannot formulate and justify universal ethical norms: "The Greek way of life, the polis, was defended not because it was Greek, but because it was more natural than other (for example, despotic) constitutions". (Ibid., 86) In order to prevent today's civilisation from relapsing into pure despotism in which — according to Joas — individual states dictate to their citizens which universal norms and values they must adhere to, it is necessary to refasten universalism to objective, natural law criteria: "Where universalism as a European way of thinking no longer focuses on the absolute, as in Plato and in the Christian tradition, but instead on itself and its own tradition, it becomes nihilistic". (Ibid., 86f) We can thus deduce from Kondylis's ideational-historical critique of human rights universalism and Joas's sociological de-emphasising of the dysfunctional power of religion that ethical universalism in the form that Spaemann describes it cannot be conceived of as an inclusivist expansion of moral rights and social norms that naturally provokes strong political resentments, but can only be revived in connection with the apologetics of its natural law core. The struggle to rediscover this natural law core has begun.

Dr. Martin Hähnel is the director of the Carlsbad Institute and a lecturer at the University of Bremen.

Joas, Hans, Universalismus. Weltherrschaft und Menschheitsethos. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2025.

Kondylis, Panajotis, Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992.

Mohr, G. “Hat Kants Universalismus ausgedient?” ZEMO 7, 401–411 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-024-00198-x (The italicisation has been added by Martin Hähnel.)

Spaemann, Robert, „Universalismus und Eurozentrismus“. In: Universalismus, Nationalismus und die neue Einheit der Deutschen, hg. v. Petra Braitling und Walter Reese-Schäfer. Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1991.